This paper considers a class of in…nite-horizon recursive economies with incomplete markets in which short sales are restricted by an explicit debt ceiling that never binds. I prove existence of an ergodic Markov equilibrium by extending the construction in Du¢ e, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) to economies with short sales. This extension holds under the assumption that agents'marginal utilities are bounded. This particularity is due to the fact that consumption need not be bounded away from zero when heterogeneous agents can accumulate debts over time.
Introduction
In an in ‡uential work, Magill and Quinzii (1994) proved existence of a sequential equilibrium for economies with incomplete …nancial markets in which debt paths were restricted by either personalized transversality conditions, implicit debt constraints, or an explicit uniform debt ceiling that never binds. They also show that those three equilibrium concepts coincide for a broad class of in…nite-horizon exchange economies. Similar equivalence results are found in Hernández and Santos (1996) and in Levine and Zame (1996) . These papers are celebrated because they present di¤erent ways to rule out Ponzi schemes without introducing additional market imperfections into the economy. Among these alternatives, models with explicit debt constraints became usual in macroeconomics and …nance.
In another seminal paper, Du¢ e, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) proved existence of a spotless stationary Markov equilibrium for a class of recursive economies with incomplete …nancial markets and without short sales of assets. This result is important because some type of stationarity is always required for numerical computation of the equilibrium. The authors also show that if one introduces a weak form of sunspots (to convexify the expectations correspondence), then the stationary Markov equilibrium has an ergodic invariant measure. In other words, in a stationary Markov equilibrium process with initial states drawn from the ergodic invariant measure , the time series distribution of the state vector (which includes asset prices) asymptotically converges to almost surely. Since ergodicity cannot be empirically tested, this class of existence results is our best justi…cation for using asymptotic theory in …nancial time series. This paper considers a general class of recursive economies with incomplete markets and short sales. Like in Magill and Quinzii (1994) , these economies present a uniform lower bound on impatience. Therefore, there exists a uniform debt ceiling that never binds in equilibrium. This debt ceiling is imposed on individual budget constraints in order to rule out Ponzi schemes, and the structure in Du¢ e et al.
(1994) is adapted to prove existence of a spotless stationary Markov equilibrium and of a conditionally spotless ergodic Markov equilibrium. The existence results hold under the assumption that agents'marginal utilities are bounded. This particularity is due to the fact that individual consumption may get arbitrarily close to zero even when endowments are uniformly bounded away from zero and the Bernoulli utility functions are unbounded from below or satisfy the Inada conditions (see Beker and Chattopadhyay, 2010 ).
This contribution is of general interest for economists. The ergodic equilibrium result serves as a theoretical support for a broad literature in …nance that combines asymptotic time series and asset pricing equations derived under the assumption of unrestricted short sales (e.g., Cochrane, 2001 ). Furthermore, the stationary equilibrium result contributes to an ongoing controversy on existence of recursive equilibrium in economies with incomplete markets and debt constraints that never binds. Krebs (2004) showed that, for some economies, market clearing and interior optimality conditions imply individual consumption to lie in a bounded open set in any recursive equilibrium. 1 For those economies, the stationary equilibrium process-which is de…ned here over a compact set-must be constructed in such a way that maximal and minimal consumption values are not reached almost surely.
The remaining of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a general class of recursive exchange economies, de…nes the Walrasian equilibrium concept, and derives a uniform debt ceiling that never binds. Next, Section 3 proves existence of two related Markov equilibrium concepts for economies with loose debt constraints. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.
Model
Consider a pure exchange economy with uncertainty, in…nitely many periods t 2 T f0; 1; :::; 1g, multiple consumption goods l 2 L f1; :::; Lg, and longlived heterogeneous agents i 2 I f1; :::; Ig. The economy's information structure is represented by a Borel probability space ( ; F; ) and a …ltration fF t g 1 t=0 such that F t F t+1 F, 8t 2 T. Each node ! 2 determines a sequence of exogenous
It is assumed that s t (!) takes S > 1 di¤erent values with positive probability, and that it follows a time-homogeneous Markov process with by two agents with utility functions that are unbounded from below. 2 The economy's information structure accomodates the possibility of sunspots in equilibrium.
It reduces to the usual spotless sequential event tree when S 1 and, for each t 2 T, Ft is the Borel -algebra generated by the intersection of all Borel -algebras containing the subsets For notational convenience, the decision node index (t; !) is omitted throughout the paper. The time index t is used when the context requires. Otherwise, the subscripts +1 and 1 respectively indicate the next-period and previous-period realization of the underlying random variable.
In each period t, individual endowments are determined by time-invariant functions e i : S ! R L ++ , 8i 2 I. Agent i's preference is numerically represented by a time-separable expected utility function V i . For any R L + -valued stochastic process x i fx i;t g 1 t=0 on ( ; F; ), de…ne:
where E 0 represents the mathematical expectation conditional on the information set F 0 ; i 2 (0; 1) is an agent-speci…c discount factor; and u i : D ! R is a bounded, continuous, nondecreasing, and concave Bernoulli utility function, which is monotonically increasing in its …rst coordinate and whose domain D is an open set containing
+ implies that the supergradient set:
is nonempty and compact, for every x i 2 R L + . Moreover, the supergradient correspondence @u i is upper hemicontinuous on R L + . This construction imposes marginal utilities to be bounded on the boundary of R L + . 3 Markets open every period to trade the L consumption goods and J > 0 shortlived numeraire assets a j 2 R S + , 8j 2 J f1; :::; Jg. Asset payo¤s are linearly ! 2 : (s0 (!) ; :::; st (!)) = s t , for all s t in the t-fold Cartesian product of S. 3 Recursive models usually assume Bernoulli utility functions that are unbounded from below.
In many models, this guarantees that individual consumption is bounded away from zero. In those cases, the supergradient correspondence is upper hemicontinuous, nonempty, and compact valued in the subset of the consumption set that is individually rational. This is used, for instance, by independent, and there is a risk-free asset. Commodity and asset prices are respectively represented by p 2 R L + and q 2 R J + . In each decision node, these prices lie in n (p; q) 2 R L+J + :
Agents choose their personal consumption bundle and portfolio (x i ; i ) 2 R L + R J taking as given: (i) their previous-period portfolio i; 1 2 R J ; (ii) the current prices (p; q) 2 ; and (iii) the stochastic process describing the future prices. They
satisfy the following budget constraints:
This economy is characterized by E fI; T; S; P; (V i ; e i ) i2I ; a; M g. Markets are said to clear when the following feasibility constraint holds (almost surely):
Walrasian Equilibrium
Competitive equilibrium is de…ned in this setting by a stochastic process fz t g 1 t=0 on ( ; F; ), where z (s; 1 ; x; ; p; q) is a state variable composed of the exogenous state s 2 S, the previous-period portfolios 1 2 Y 1 R JI , and the current individual choices and prices (x; ; p; q) 2 Y 2 R LI + R JI . 4 Let z take value in a nonempty space Z which embeds the economy's feasibility constraints as follows:
A Z-valued stochastic process fz t g 1 t=0 on ( ; F; ) is said to be consistent for the economy E if, for each t 2 T, z t is F t -measurable, the conditional probability of s t+1 given (z 0 ; :::; z t ) is P st almost surely, and 1 (z t+1 ) = (z t ) almost surely.
For a given consistent process fz t g 1 t=0 , a policy fx i;t ;~ i;t g 1 t=0 on ( ; F; ) is budget feasible if it is F t -measurable and satis…es (3)-(4) almost surely, 8t 2 T. For a given consistent fz t g 1 t=0 , a budget-feasible policy fx i;t ;~ i;t g 1 t=0 is individually optimal if there is no other budget-feasible policy fx 0 i;t ;
De…nition 1.
A Walrasian equilibrium is a consistent Z-valued stochastic process fz t g 1 t=0 with the property that the policy fx i;t ; i;t g 1 t=0 is individually optimal, 8i 2 I.
Debt Ceilings that Never Bind
The assumptions on utility functions and endowments guarantee the existence of a uniform lower bound on impatience, in the sense of Magill and Quinzii (1994), Hernández and Santos (1996) , and Levine and Zame (1996) . In other words, there exists 2 (0; 1) such that:
for any i 2 I and any R L + -valued process x i fx i;t g 1 t=0 on ( ; F; ) that is essentially bounded by e 2 P i2I max s2S (e i;s ).
Lemma 1. Fix some 2 (0; 1) satisfying equation (7). In any Walrasian equilibrium, the value of individual portfolio is almost surely uniformly bounded by: . Thus, condition (7) closes the argument, since equilibrium consumption bundles are essentially bounded by e 2 P i2I max s2S (e i;s ). Finally, given that q i 1 1 almost surely, the feasibility constraints imply the …rst inequality in (8).
Notice that the debt limit will never bind in a Walrasian equilibrium.
Ergodic Markov Equilibrium
The equilibrium analysis follows the structure formulated in Du¢ e et al. (1994) , where the main elements are the state space and the expectations correspondence.
The states z (s;
and let B Z be the Borel -algebra over Z, P Z be the set of probability measures on (Z; B Z ), and g : Z ! P Z be a set-valued function de…ned by conditions (a)-(b).
(a) The set g (z) is empty unless the individual choices embedded in z satisfy the budget-constraint inequalities (3)-(4) and the wealth inequality: 
Condition (a) states that g(z) is empty for states z that are not consistent with budget feasibility and the wealth inequality (9) . For now, inequality (9) is just a technical condition which assures that the recursive budget set fx i 2 R L + : 9 i 2 R J s:t: (3)-(4)g has an interior point, for every (p; q) 2 such that q 6 = 0. Notice that , and q 6 = 0.) Lemma 2. There exists p 1;inf > 0 such that, for every state z 2 Z satisfying g (z) 6 = ;, one has p 1 p 1;inf .
Proof. The function u i is concave, nondecreasing, and increasing in good 1.
Moreover, its supergradient set @u i (x i ) is nonempty and bounded, for each
x i e and @ l u i (x i ) is the set composed of the lth coordinates of all vectors in @u i (x i ). Notice also that P l2L p l 1 since (p; q) 2 . Moreover, the feasibility condition imposed on Z implies x i;1 > 0 for some i 2 I. Thus, conditions (10)-(11) in the de…nition of g imply p 1 p 1;inf
Next, Lemma 3 shows that the graph of g is closed when states are restricted to lie in a compact subset of Z. This is a key condition for existence of a stationary equilibrium.
Lemma 3. Let K be a compact subset of Z. The correspondence g (z) \ P K , for z 2 K, has a closed graph.
Proof. Take two convergent sequences fz n g 1 n=0 ! z and f n g 1 n=0 ! such that z n 2 K and n 2 g (z n ) \ P K ; 8n. To show that 2 g (z) \ P K , notice the following four facts. First, if z n satis…es the budget-constraint inequalities (3)-(4) and the wealth inequality (9), for every n, then z satis…es condition (a) in the de…nition of g. Second, for each n, there exist h n such that condition (b.1) holds. Since K is compact, fh n g 1 n=0 is bounded and, then, it has a subsequence that converges to some function h such that the support of is the graph of h. Third, for every n, the marginal of n on S is P ( j s) and the marginal of n on Y 1 is degenerated into n almost surely. Thus, the limit probability satis…es conditions (b.2)-(b.3)-that is, its marginal on S and on Y 1 are respectively given by P ( j s) and by the Dirac measure at lim n . Finally, the conditions in (b.4)-(b.5) are preserved in the limit-since @u i is upper hemicontinuous, nonempty, and compact valued, for x i 2 R L + -and then hold for (z; ) lim (z n ; n ).
The economy E fI; T; S; P; (V i ; e i ) i2I ; a; M g is represented by the state space Z, the expectations correspondence g, and some arbitrary initial condition (ŝ;^ 1 ) 2 S Y 1 . Let us now de…ne and prove existence of a …rst equilibrium concept used in this paper.
De…nition 2 (Stationary Markov Equilibrium).
A stationary Markov equilibrium for economy E is a pair (Z; ), where Z is a measurable subset of Z and : Z ! P Z is a transitional probability such that z 2 g(z), 8z 2 Z.
A stationary Markov equilibrium is composed of a set of states and a law of motion such that the current realization of z determines the future stochastic equilibrium path. This concept encompass the Walrasian notion of equilibrium, since conditions (a) and (b) in the de…nition of g imply that any stationary Markov Z-valued process fz t g 1 t=0 with transition is consistent and individually optimal.
Moreover, since probabilities in g must have S mass points, any stationary Markov equilibrium for g is spotless.
Proposition 1. There exists a (spotless) stationary Markov equilibrium (Z; ), for
any economy E such that M >
Proof. The proof has three steps. First, let a T -horizon equilibrium be a Walrasian equilibrium for a truncated economy in which time is restricted to lie in f0; :::; T g T and i;T = 0; 8i 2 I. For any …nite T > 0, there exists a spotless T -horizon equilibrium when the initial portfolio is^ 1 = 0. This result is standard in the literature, and the basic structure of its proof can be found in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
Second, equilibrium consumption bundles are uniformly bounded from above and lie in X x i 2 R L + : x i e almost surely. Equilibrium portfolios are also uniformly bounded and (almost surely) lie in a compact set R J . To see this, notice from (3)- (4) Since that proof is constructive, it is worth presenting a short version here.
Since conditions (a)-(b) in the de…nition of g hold for any spotless T -horizon equilibrium, the set g (z) is nonempty for some z 2 K. Let Z 0 = K and Z n = fz 2 Z n 1 : 9 2 g (z) s:t: sup (Z n 1 ) = 1g, 8n > 0, where the supremum of is taken over Borel measurable subsets of Z n 1 .
Z n is the closure of Z n . Notice that Z is nonempty and compact since it is the intersection of a nested sequence of nonempty compact sets. One can then …nd a measure 2 g (z) \ P Z , for each z 2 Z. Take a sequence fz n g 1 n=0 ! z such that z n 2 Z n . For each n, take n 2 g (z n ) such that sup (Z n 1 ) = 1 (which is possible since z n 2 Z n ). Since n 2 P Zn and fP Zn g 1 n=0 is a descending sequence of compact sets with intersection P Z , there is a measure lim n that lies in P Z . This limit measure must lie in g (z) since this correspondence has a closed graph when its domain is restrict to the compact set K (see Lemma 3) . This concludes the proof.
It sometimes useful to associate an invariant ergodic measure to a stationary Markov equilibrium transition. This de…nes a new equilibrium concept which implies that, if the initial state is drawn with distribution , then the distribution of all future realization of the system is also . This is the analogue of the deterministic notion of a steady state. 
Concluding Remarks
A few concluding remarks must be made. First, di¤erently from Du¢ e et al.
(1994), the existence results in this paper do not hold for any initial portfolio^ 1 .
In economies with short sales, individual initial debts cannot be arbitrary since, otherwise, the set of budget-feasible allocations might be empty. In the proof of Proposition 1, an equilibrium is shown to exist when the initial portfolio is^ 1 = 0.
If …nancial trades occur in equilibrium (which is typically the case), then there are nonnull portfolios that could be drawn in the initial state (for a given equilibrium process). In fact, any state drawn from the ergodic invariant measure can be an initial condition. The only particularity to be noticed is that the set of possible initial conditions is endogenous and depends on the stochastic process describing the equilibrium prices. The choice^ 1 = 0 is the simplest available for computation.
However, there is no guarantee that the stationary equilibrium process will converge to an invariant measure unless the process is initially drawn from .
A second issue to be stressed is that, for economies with M > I 1 1 , the debt constraints will never bind in equilibrium. Therefore, asset prices are given by:
where i and i;s +1 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers de…ned in Section 3-see condition (b.5) in the de…nition of g.
Marginal utilities were assumed to be bounded in the frontier of R L + in order to guarantee the closed-graph property of g (see Lemma 3) . Nevertheless, the model still admits cases in which x i;1 > 0 almost surely, 8i 2 I. In those cases, and assuming that u i is di¤erentiable, the asset pricing equation reduces to:
P (s +1 j s) @u i x i;s +1 =@x i;1;s +1 @u i (x i;s ) =@x i;1;s a s +1 :
Krebs (2004) showed that, for some economies in this context, no maximum or minimum consumption level can be achieved with positive probability. For those economies, even though the equilibrium state variable takes values in a compact self-justi…ed set, the equilibrium transition will assure that maximum and minimal consumption values are not reached almost surely.
